C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000248
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/18/2035
TAGS PREL, PHUM, PGOV, SOCI, KN, KS, CH
SUBJECT: A/S CAMPBELL DISCUSSES DPRK FUTURE WITH EXPERTS
Classified By: AMB D. Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
SUMMARY
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¶1. (C) A group of five ROK opinion leaders and experts on
North Korea issues told A/S Kurt Campbell on February 3 it was
difficult to predict whether Kim Jong-il’s youngest son Kim
Jong-un would be able to succeed his father without sparking
instability in the North. Of the five experts, one thought the
younger Kim might succeed and one argued his lack of
leadership experience made it unlikely he would win the
support of the ruling elites. They agreed that Kim Jong-il’s
brother-in-law Jang Song-taek would prove a strong rival for
the younger Kim and would probably be tempted to challenge
him. Kim Jong-il had used draconian controls and international
aid to discourage coups after having foiled three such
attempts in the late 90s. China’s strategic interests were
fundamentally at odds with U.S.-ROK interests in North Korea.
End Summary. Succession in Progress but Success in Doubt
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¶2. (C) Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell met on February 3
with Korean opinion leaders with a keen interest in DPRK
issues to hear their views on the future of North Korea. The
experts agreed that regime succession was fully underway and
that the North Korean people had accepted the process.
XXXXXXXXXXX said a North Korean diplomat based in Beijing had
told him over the phone that morning that the DPRK Foreign
Ministry had instructed all of its overseas missions to “lay
the foundation for leadership change in Pyongyang.” Most of
the experts believed the challenge for Kim Jong-il’s youngest
son and designated heir, Kim Jong-un, would most likely come
after his father died. XXXXXXXXXXX recalled the Chosun
Dynasty’s 500 year history in which political intrigue and
tension might simmer for years, but tended to erupt only after
the king died. 3. (C) The group agreed that Kim Jong-il’s
brother-in-law and right-hand man Jang Song-taek was
spearheading the succession drive and would be a rival for
power once Kim Jong-un’s father died, but the group was split
on the younger Kim’s prospects for holding onto power.
XXXXXXXXXXX believed it would be difficult for Jang to wrest
power from the younger Kim once the succession process was
complete. XXXXXXXXXXX suggested it was unclear whether Jang
would be content to control the younger Kim from behind the
curtain, or would challenge him directly for outright control.
XXXXXXXXXXX
Doubts About Younger Kim’s Experience
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¶4. (C) There were many reasons to doubt that Kim Jong-un
would be able to successfully fend off challenges to his
control after his father died. XXXXXXXXXXX noted that Kim
Jong-il had twenty years of experience as an official of the
Korean Workers’ Party before his father died. Furthermore, Kim
Jong-il had the benefit of years of guidance from his father
after he had been officially anointed in 1980 to eventually
succeed him. By contrast, Kim Jong-un had very limited
experience and might not get much direct guidance before Kim
Jong-il dies. Even now, XXXXXXXXXXX it was not clear that Kim
Jong-il’s health was good enough to exercise the faculties
necessary for day-to-day management of state affairs. Given
the limited opportunity the younger Kim had to gain
experience, XXXXXXXXXXX doubted his ability to solidify his
position in the Party and win the unwavering support of
Pyongyang’s power elites. XXXXXXXXXXX recalled the tumultuous
state of affairs in the ROK following the death of President
Park Chung Hee in 1979 and suggested the DPRK succession would
be “100 times more troublesome.” XXXXXXXXXXX
Tight Control and Aid Kept Regime Afloat
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¶5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX opined that brutal repression and
international aid had been the secrets of Kim Jong-il’s
ability to fend off challenges. After three separate coup
attempts in the 90s, Kim Jong-il had implemented very strict
controls and sent a stern warning to would-be plotters by
executing anyone who had been even remotely involved in the
plots. Therefore, only the military could even dare consider
rising up, but the Security Services had successfully kept the
military in check. XXXXXXXXXXXwent on to suggest that the
“indulgence” of the international community over the past ten
years had also helped sustain the regime. The large-scale
assistance provided to the regime by the ROK, China, the U.S.,
Japan and others had been intended in part to avoid a hard
landing, and indeed had kept the regime afloat, he said. [Name
removed] suggested that North Korea had skillfully played
Washington and Beijing off one another.XXXXXXXXXXX believed
that the DPRK had exploited large amounts of assistance from
China, taking advantage of a situation in which Beijing was
presumed by Washington to have significant influence over
Pyongyang. China
Complicates the Endgame
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¶6. (C) The experts agreed that China’s obsession with DPRK
stability at all costs, was clearly and fundamentally at odds
with U.S. and ROK interests. Given a choice between reaching
out to Seoul or Beijing, [name removed] believed that
Pyongyang elites would reflexively look to China for support
if they believed they needed help in maintaining stability.
The Seoul option would be unacceptable because of the U.S.-ROK
alliance and concerns over becoming subservient to Seoul.
China, on the other hand, would gladly provide support with
few or no strings attached, just to maintain the DPRK as an
independent entity, XXXXXXXXXXX maintained.
¶7. (C)XXXXXXXXXXXnoted that although Washington had a keen
interest in both denuclearization and human rights, the U.S.
stake in North Korea was minimal compared to that of China by
virtue of its proximity to the North. China did not share
American perspectives on these two key issues, considering
them somewhat abstract. Rather, Beijing was concerned about
what it considered to be more concrete issues, such as a
potential flood of “economic migrants” and broader social
unrest on its immediate border. Reaching the People and Close
Cooperation are Key
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¶8. (C) Negating Chinese influence over the long term, [Name
removed] observed, would involve close U.S.-ROK cooperation in
winning the hearts and minds of the North Korean people.
XXXXXXXXXXX STEPHENS