Monday, 27 April 2009, 06:35
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000672
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/27/2019
TAGS PGOV, KN, KS
SUBJECT: MND: DPRK MILITARY RHETORIC AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
COMMISSION CHANGES ARE ABOUT SUCCESSION
Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: The DPRK's recent restaffing and expansion of
the National Defense Commission (NDC) and its hostile military
rhetoric over the last several months are related to the DPRK
leadership's "top priority" need to stabilize the DPRK
internally in preparation for succession, according to Colonel
Lee Sang-chul, Ministry of National Defense North Korea Policy
Division Director and lead ROKG representative to Colonellevel
military-to-military talks in October 2008. A second
priority was to achieve improved relations with the United
States, which the DPRK regards as its only potential security
guarantor, ironically. END SUMMARY.
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Military Statements and the NDC
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2. (C) In an April 23 meeting, Lee told Poloff that the Korean
People's Army's (KPA) spate of high-level announcements over
the past several months (such as the March 8 KPA Supreme
Command report, the first in 15 years, and the four KPA
General Staff statements since January, not seen since 1999)
should not be misinterpreted as the DPRK military asserting
control over the country, because the military could act only
in concert with the Worker's Party and the Cabinet. Instead
the "generals appearing on TV" was a phenomenon directed at
DPRK citizens with two goals: to show that the DPRK's hostile
external situation meant citizens had to pull together, and as
a "power display" to send a law-and-order message to counter
the increasing economic disorder resulting from decades of
economic "depression." There was dissatisfaction among some
elite groups in the DPRK, who knew of economic reform in China
and Vietnam and wondered why the DPRK had instead deteriorated.
To tamp down this internal dissent, external tension was
needed. The ROKG was not particularly worried about the
specific threats to the South contained in the statements
because they saw the statements as targeted at the domestic
audience, and in any case knew the DPRK would try to achieve
surprise if it were to resort to military action, rather than
giving warning.
3. (C) The key factor in the background was 67-year-old Kim
Jong-il's (KJI) waning health. After KJI's August 2008 stroke,
the DPRK was a "different environment that needed stronger
leadership." Lee said that before the stroke, KJI was
confident that he could rule for years, but afterward he
suffered "physical and psychological trauma." KJI had become
obsessed with creating political stability to allow an orderly
succession, though Lee did not claim to know who was next in
line. Immediately after the April 5 missile launch the Supreme
People's Assembly had declared the beginning of KJI's third
ruling period. But rather than celebrating the renewal of his
mandate, KJI was concentrating on changes that would pave the
way for succession.
4. (C) The most important of these was the enlargement (from 8
to 13 members) and strengthening of the KJI-chaired National
Defense Commission (NDC). The NDC was first established in
1998 with a largely symbolic role, but had since taken on
policy and coordination functions. Now it had the lead on
succession, Lee believed. KJI brother-in-law Chang Song-taek's
addition to the NDC was important for succession preparation,
not only because he was married to KJI's only sibling and
close confidante 63-year-old Kim Kyong-hui, but also because
Chang was seen as having effectively protected and acted for
KJI during KJI's fall 2008 recovery period.
5. (C) Another key change was the replacement of National
Defense Commission Deputy Chairman Kim Yong-chun with Oh Kukryul,
a 78-year old Kim-family loyalist (in relative terms,
since all senior officials are loyalists) who Lee thought was
consolidating various ROK-surveillance and special operations
institutions under his control at NDC. One of these was the
Worker's Party's Operations Department, which Oh has headed
since 1989. (Lee also referred to an April 21 JoongAng Ilbo
newspaper article claiming that "Office 35," charged with
intel collection, and the "External Liaison Office," charged
with training agents, had both been moved from the Operations
Department to NDC/KPA control, saying that ROK intel sources
did not think there was
evidence of such a move.) The Operations Department, which
formulates actions against the South, was "passive" during the
1999-2007 Sunshine Policy period, but was now becoming more
active again. In other words, Oh's job was to keep the South
off balance and make sure that it did not disrupt the
succession period. Lee said he believed that changes to the
DPRK constitution, announced but not yet explained, would also
focus on succession-related issues. He alluded to frequent
DPRK propaganda aiming for the establishment of a "strong and
prosperous" nation by 2012, saying that DPRK authorities
believed they had already succeeded ideologically and
militarily, so they were concentrating on the economic side,
which is where the Kaesong Industrial Complex fit in.
6. (C) The DPRK's determination to maintain internal order
meant that it could go so far as to engage in "limited armed
conflict" with the ROK. At the same time, the DPRK was well
aware that ROK forces were ready for any provocation and would
respond with superior force. In addition, the DPRK knew that
combined ROK-U.S. surveillance capabilities would prevent it
from achieving surprise, so Lee was reassured that no direct
military provocation was imminent.
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Relations with the U.S.
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7. (C) Asked what the ROKG's policy options were, given the
above situation, Lee answered indirectly, saying that the main
question was U.S.-DPRK relations. Second only to maintaining
internal stability to allow for succession was the DPRK's
determination to improve relations with the U.S., because only
the U.S. could solve both the DPRK's security and economic
problems. Lee said this push for improved relations was ironic,
given DPRK rhetoric attacking the U.S. as a menace, but was
nevertheless high on DPRK authorities' agenda. Lee said the
DPRK saw the 1999-2000 rapprochement with the Clinton
Administration as the first, failed, chance for peace with the
U.S.; that the Bush (43) Administration had turned to
negotiations too late for substantial progress; and that the
Obama Administration amounted to a "second chance." The DPRK
craved a dialogue with the U.S., aiming for a "big deal," but
first needed to raise tensions to create the need for dialogue.
8. (C) The scope for inter-Korean relations depended on what
happened with U.S.-DPRK relations. Lee was convinced that the
DPRK would keep tension high towards the South, while seeking
an opening with the U.S. Therefore, his recommendation to ROK
policymakers was to stay on an even keel to keep the South-
North situation from deteriorating further. The DPRK's April
21 proposal for dialogue about land-use and wages at the
Kaesong Industrial Complex was potentially helpful in that
regard, but had to be approached carefully, because the DPRK
would try to seize the initiative and lock-in economic
benefits without offering reciprocal steps. Like other ROKG
officials, Lee emphasized the need for continued close U.S.-
ROK coordination on all issues related to North Korea.
9. (C) Lee cautioned that China would seek to prevent U.S.-
DPRK relations from improving too much, adding with a smile
that had it not been for its attitude toward the U.S., China
would have moved to prevent the October 2006 DPRK nuclear
weapon test.
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Mt. Kumgang
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10. (C) As an aside, Lee commented on the July 2008 shooting
death of a South Korean tourist at Mt. Kumgang. He said that
KPA soldiers and sentries in the area, after frequent contact
with South Korean tourists, had a tendency to be too relaxed,
so KPA officers periodically conducted exercises to tighten
discipline. The shooting had occurred during one of those
exercise periods. STEPHENS